

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

C-II\My '64 Study\Inferences

Notes on my study and interviews

--Cline said that (like Sorensen, years later) that if JFK had thought it likely that the SU would put in missiles despite his Sept. 4 and Sept. 13 warnings of "grave consequences," (which were actually "too late"!) he would not have made the warnings.

And that could have been the case if McCone had pressed his case stronger, and had stayed in town in August to press it! (I wonder if he didn't have reasons to believe it that he didn't share with his ONE analysts, about Mongoose, assassination, and even—if he knew about them, which he probably did (never addressed by anyone: who knew outside the DOD?)—the invasion contingency planning.) He could have "connected the dots" for JFK. Although he would have had to overcome their confidence in what they were hearing not so much from Dobrynin but from Bolshakov. Which they almost surely didn't share with their Republican DCI, who they were bypassing! (Did they share it all with Rusk?)

(I didn't learn the Bolshakov channel in my study, did I? Reportedly he wasn't ambiguous about "defensive weapons": he assured them from Khrushchev that there would be no ground-to-ground missiles. That undermines my study theory that he was building a case that he hadn't "lied." Or that he might even have been sincere; though why then be so secretive about the transport?)

(Thus, bypassing diplomatic channels, JFK had allowed himself to be manipulated, fooled by Khrushchev; he had been "naïve," wishful; relied on personal impressions of RFK of Bolshakov; though in fact Bolshakov himself seems to have been lied to (like Dobrynin), manipulated (though "his usefulness was not at an end").

So my study theory needs to be set aside: that the administration officials had simply misinterpreted, been wishful in what they heard, which was actually ambiguous. I wondered at the time why they seemed so mad at having been lied to, betrayed, when that wasn't conclusive from the available record (if Khrushchev could argue, as he could, that the missiles were "defensive," like those in Turkey; all the more, given the invasion threats, even the public ones).

It remains possible that K thought JFK might keep his knowledge of the missiles secret until after the election: not only to avoid a pre-election crisis over Cuba but to avoid a pre-election crisis over Berlin. K was explicitly threatening that he might raise the Berlin issue before the election "if forced to" (as, by a crisis over Cuba): and promised explicitly that he would not, if not forced to.

(So JFK et al were not off the wall in believing K was linking Cuba to Berlin, especially after they discovered the missiles. It's not clear to this day whether K really intended to

resolve Berlin after the election, in November. One thesis is that he was making these warnings to distract JFK from what he was doing in Cuba (although JFK kept bringing up Cuba anyway, to the Sovs). It might have served to convince those who knew of Bolshakov that the coming crisis was going to be over Berlin, NOT over Cuba: i.e. to convince them there would be no missiles in Cuba, even after the intelligence analysts were moving over toward McCone's position. (Cline; Nitze; a Navy analyst).

And JFK didn't know of this, precisely because of PSALM! (But by then it was too late for him to avoid his "commitments," or Republican pressure to act (Keating was getting this from Clare Booth Luce, who was getting it from Cubans: ref? JFK was NOT getting it from Cubans, i.e. from his own analysts).

Might K have thought this? Well, I gather (check my notes) that CIA suspected precisely this motive was the reason for JFK's unprecedented restrictions on distribution of intelligence. Carter warned of political repercussions if it came out that they had been covering up: the softest interpretation of this warning would be "it might LOOK to critics that that was your intent"! JFK says, "Let me worry about political repercussions."

I.e., kindest interpretation: Let me weigh the repercussions of this leaking out, against the repercussions of "ambiguous indications of missiles" leaking out! (I think, see Cline: once the missiles were definite, Bundy on his own did allow greater distribution (but then, Bundy wanted an air strike, at first!) But PSALM remained, did it not? How much did the ExComm differ from PSALM distribution?! (Or 303 Committee, SGA: Mongoose. Or "special handling" of invasion planning: limited to Mongoose-knowledgeable planners!)

CIA may or may not have been right in this suspicion about JFK's motives. Again, the kind interpretation: JFK wanted to have his decision for response made before there was public knowledge of the situation. (There was no question what the response of Congress would be—as it was, even from Democrats!) That could mean: he wanted to explore alternatives to airstrike or invasion. And: he didn't want to face this pressure just from Il-28s, which was the immediate occasion for the restrictions.

AHA! Hyp: at the least (perhaps most, in his mind) he DID intend to keep the evidence of Il-28s secret until after the election! (When DID they get announced?) Having made his public commitments, he didn't want his hand forced by those (assuming that THEY did not constitute a violation of his warnings or Sov assurances). See discussion before Sept. 4 of how to word it, what to cover, and what not explicitly).

[FIND hsr report]

Now, Khrushchev may have noted that JFK did NOT respond to the Il-28s (would he have known that JFK would have seen these? Crates?) and that could have reassured him that JFK would not respond to the missiles, either, before the election.

OR, knowing that when it came out there would be a Republican explosion (“We told you so! You were wrong, asleep, naïve! Weak, in inviting this! You should have invaded a month ago!”) he wanted to be able to preempt that by announcing simultaneously that he was attacking, blockading or invading. That could explain why the restrictions were so important to him two days after his Sept. 4 commitment, still further with PSALM on October AND why the contingency planning for invasion was accelerated on October 1-2.

There was NOT either a definite presidential intention nor a decision (unconditionally) to invade or attack, prior to October 16 OR EVER.

There was a strong desire by the JCS, by many Republicans, by some (many?) in CIA/DDO to invade and overthrow Castro. The Mongoose team was clear that the aims of their project (highest national priority) required an invasion, though not, preferably, in the absence of an appearance of an uprising or a provocation (possibly faked). (Cf 34A, de Soto) (9-11?)

But there was urgent operational planning and deployments—high “cost no consideration”—to be able to launch an invasion, air attack or blockade very quickly before the election, to be triggered by one of several contingencies, some unlikely—an uprising—some not unlikely (by October 1, to analysts other than the White House): offensive missiles (did Nitze keep his view unknown to McNamara?! What did McNamara think?).

Because of the critical Sept. 4 commitment (repeated Sept. 13) —made on the mistaken assumption that it would not be challenged (see RFK warning to Dobrynin on Oct. 27 about shooting at recon planes!)—the discovery was inevitably a crisis for JFK. (Who was surprised, angry, humiliated, betrayed. First reaction: they must go: by air strike.

Second reaction: there must be military action, for domestic political reasons. And for bluffing K out, if that were possible. And for international credibility: it must at least appear that JFK/US was seriously considering an air strike, “ready” to do it, on the verge, didn’t rule it out...even if they were persuaded by the UN to make a trade to avoid world war. (Though if the latter were possible: what was the worth of US commitments in Europe, if the UN asked them to draw back, as they would? “Berlin is not Cuba,” for the US”” Why not? Europe?...)

If he had not made the commitment, he wouldn’t have faced what McNamara called a domestic political crisis. (Or the international credibility issue. Europe didn’t care about Cuba). He could have reacted as Nitze and Rusk first did: “We have to eat it.” As K expected. (Apparently totally neglecting the domestic political considerations; and the effects of **his own lies, without which JFK would not have made the commitment.**

Thus, having supplemented his secrecy with private-channel lies, K had **induced a commitment** which virtually assured a crisis for himself, if the secrecy didn’t hold. JFK might have kept the Il-w8s secret, even the FROGS or FKR’s, until the election; but he

couldn't keep the presence of missiles secret! The risks for K went up sharply on Sept. 4 and Sept. 13, but K didn't reconsider: he sped ahead. (Meanwhile, the lack of overhead cover seems to have been institutional inertia, routine, incompetence. Castro criticized it). (And the failure to shoot down the U-2? Maybe K thought that would contradict his assurance of "causing no trouble before the election"! Costly! (He could have warned against overflights openly, and privately, too. Why was he giving that particular assurance, unless for hope that JFK would keep the secret?))

The ExComm had to bear witness that JFK was firm, tough, ready to use force (though this looked in question on the 27th—to Bundy, Nitze, Dillon (McCone?), Taylor?—and totally contradicted on the 28th in the eyes of the JCS (even Shoup and Wheeler!)) Or was it? How could Anderson or LeMay really blame JFK for accepting "victory" on the 28th: unless they really believed K would renege on the missiles; or they realized that JFK didn't share at all their priorities about invading Cuba over getting the missiles out, given their readiness for it and the "excuse" he had had for days (not so good on the 28th!

Didn't they have to admit that K had just taken away that excuse? They could still hold it against JFK that his tactics of gradual squeeze had produced this backdown, depriving them of their excuse! It was a victory for him, a defeat for them! (A victory for Castro! Even for K, in averting the best excuse they would ever get for an attack on the SU: LeMay's dream, after the missile gap and before the SU produced real missiles!

Still, they had to feel very confident (mistakenly) that they would get all the missiles before they could be fired, and that there would be no unauthorized action. But they also had to discount the costs if they were mistaken about this! As for response on Berlin, LeMay probably thought it unlikely, as he said (with reason); but **he wouldn't have minded being wrong about this!**

JFK had made Chief of Staff a man that he **knew wanted** to use SIOP-62, or, second-best, SIOP-63! (Note that McNamara managed to replace Anderson, for insubordination; he probably didn't expect insubordination from LeMay; yet LeMay went pretty far toward that, in insolence (See what he'd said to me!); and in a crisis, his advice, his potential for leaking, his judgments, his actions (see Power on DefCon 2, the Vandenberg firing, the U-2 over Russia (and lack of reproof!))

Whose idea was it to deploy B-52s to civilian airports! (Risk of accident; making cities military targets in preemptive strike; abandonment of no-cities strategy...!)

(Given preoccupation with decapitation, with hitting command and control—in cities—then Moscow couldn't really be spared; or other C3 cities; given that, where was a no-cities strategy possible? Or a coercive strategy? Was mine really a second-strike strategy, or a preemptive second-strike strategy? (What it really was, was an escalatory strategy: but not one that SAC would implement. Would Moscow have survived, avoiding all weapons targeted on it? Was it ever really prepared as an option? Or, a city-sparing, no ground burst option?)

Maybe I got a no-China option, even no-satellites (near cities); and reserving Polaris. Could US cities be spared if Moscow were hit? Maybe I got an option not to hit cities in initial waves; but if SU retaliation were against US cities (as it would have been: especially with Moscow hit) that wouldn't have lasted long. Polaris. We'd get (Polaris) "minimum deterrence" targeting AND (air force) counterforce targeting: true "optimum mix" attack. No city-sparing. [And nuclear winter! Which I didn't even know about. I just wanted to avoid an unauthorized action. And to save a few hundred million lives, out of 600 million).

At most, I might have furthered what I most aimed at: some degree of PALs, high-level control (on excuse of presidential control, need for choice).

The JCS **must** have shaped "options" so that the president could NOT reliably "screw up" the SIOP attack with a "half ass" choice. (See Shoup (!) on LeMay vs. JFK in Cuba). JCS vs. LBJ on Vietnam.(Bissell on JFK on Cuba-I). JFK in VN. McN to LeMay on Cuba. McN to Anderson on Cuba.

Presidential fear of loss of control to the military. Military fear of loss of control to the president!